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the method of endoxa. I will focus on how this passage coheres 
with the remaining parts of the same chapter, which also are 
advancing methodological remarks. My claim is that the meth-
od of Ethica Eudemia I.6 is in agreement with many features of 
Aristotle’s theory of explanation as presented in the Posterior 
Analytics: Aristotle’s main concern is a warning against misuses 
of explanatory arguments.
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I. Introduction
My aim is to discuss the methodological passage 
that opens Ethica Eudemia I.6 (1216b26-35). !e pas-
sage has been recently examined in connection with 
Aristotle’s notion of dialectic and Aristotle’s method 
of endoxa. !e passage has also been compared with 
other methodological passages from the ethical trea-
tises, such as Nicomachean Ethics VII.11. My discus-
sion will have consequences on these broader issues 
too, but from a di"erent approach. Instead of asking 
what the expressions “phainomena”, “martyria” and 
“paradeigmata” mean in this context, I will discuss 
how the initial paragraph of Ethica Eudemia (hence-
forth, EE) I.6 relates to the (equally important, but 
o#en neglected) next paragraphs of the same chap-
ter. !is approach will help us to attain a better un-
derstanding of Aristotle’s points. Many of my results 
will be congenial to recent approaches that de$ate the 
supposed peculiarity of the method2. A#er all, the 
method is in agreement with many features of Aristo-
tle’s theory of explanation as presented in the Posterior 
Analytics (henceforth APo).
II. The text and the problem
Aristotle starts EE I.6 with the following methodo-
logical remark:
T1: “(i) About all these matters, we must seek con-
viction through argument, (ii) using people’s percep-
tions as evidence and example” (1216b26-28; Kenny’s 
translation).
!e Greek is this:
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“πειρατέον δὲ περὶ πάντων τούτων ζητεῖν τὴν πίστιν διὰ 
τῶν λόγων, μαρτυρίοις καὶ παραδείγμασι χρώμενον τοῖς 
φαινομένοις” (1216b26-28).
Woods’s translation employs a di"erent terminol-
ogy, but goes in the same direction (call it Version 1 
of T1)3:
T1: “(i) We must try, by argument, to reach a convincing 
conclusion on all these questions, (ii) using, as testimony 
and by way of example, what appears to be the case” 
(1216b26-28).
!e interpretation conveyed by those translations 
has the following features. First, from the standpoint 
of their structure, these translations either put the 
central element in step (i), with step (ii) adding an im-
portant qualication to the central point, or put steps 
(i) and (ii) on the same level as presenting claims that 
are equally important. Secondly, from the standpoint 
of their content, these translations suggest that Aris-
totle is recommending the use of arguments to set-
tle the issues at this juncture of his discussion. !ere 
is an important remark about the way in which one 
must appeal to arguments, but there still seem to be a 
strong recommendation to employ them in order to 
reach conviction. It is not by chance that Barnes 1980, 
p.506, says that T1 “invites us to rely on arguments, 
and to use the phenomena […] to support […] the ar-
guments” (my italics). Barnes understands that steps 
[i] and [ii] of T1 introduce two claims at the same lev-
el, namely, that we must rely on arguments to reach 
conviction on practical matters, and that we must use 
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the phainomena to control the correctness of the ar-
guments.
But is this an accurate translation of what Aristotle 
means?
III. The structure of Aristotle’s claim
Is it so obvious that steps (i) and (ii) are at the same 
level and introduce two coordinated claims?  Or is 
it so obvious that, as the second best option, step (i) 
of the passage is the central core of Aristotle’s claim, 
while step (ii) only adds important qualications? 
Is it not possible to have a di"erent parsing of the 
claim? For instance: isn’t possible to take step (ii) as 
conveying the central core of the claim, with step (i) 
just setting the framework that the claim presupposes? 
Consider two alternative translations that con-
trast with each other (Version 2 below elaborates on 
Wood’s translation, but a similar result can be attained 
from Kenny’s or Inwood-Woolf ’s translation):
Version 2: “(i) It is by argument that we must try to 
reach a conviction on all these questions, (ii) using, as 
testimony and by way of example, what appears to be 
the case” (1216b26-28).
In this translation, the use of the expression “it 
is … that” emphasises a specic way of reaching 
conviction. !e expression actually selects the way 
for reaching the target, as if dismissing alternative 
ways. !e desideratum of reaching a conviction 
takes the place of a background presupposition, and 
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Aristotle is emphatically saying that, in order to reach 
a conviction, one must use arguments. Part (ii) of the 
passage adds an important qualication: even using 
arguments, one must pay attention to what appears to 
be the case. But that one must appeal to arguments in 
order to reach a conviction is still the central claim.
To go straight to my proposal, consider a third op-
tion for the translation:
Version 3: “(i) About all these questions, when we try to 
reach a conviction through arguments, (ii) we must use 
what appears to be the case as evidence and example” 
(1216b26-28).
In this translation, step (i) is setting the back-
ground presupposition, while step (ii) introduces the 
main contention. 
I will discuss in a moment how Version 3 allows a 
better understanding of the passage 1216b26-35 as a 
whole – not only of its argumentative structure, but 
also of its connection with the ensuing passages in the 
same chapter. But rst let me explain how Version 3 is 
acceptable from a linguistic standpoint. 
Consider this sentence:
(a.1) “(i) you must go to San Francisco (ii) by car”.
Suppose someone uses this sentence to talk with 
his friend in Los Angeles. !e normal interpretation 
is that part (i), “you must go to San Francisco”, is set-
ting the scene with what is presupposed by the most 
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important part, which comes in (ii): drive a car to San 
Francisco, instead of going by train, airplane or boat 
(or walking). 
Now, the expression “by car” can be easily replaced 
with “driving” with the same e"ect:
(a.2) “(i) you must go to San Francisco (ii) driving”.
(Note that there is no comma between “San Fran-
cisco” and “driving”).
Again, your LA friend is not giving you advice 
about going to San Francisco (instead of not going), 
as if you had doubts about going or not; nor is she 
emphasising her preference to San Francisco (as if she 
were recommending you to go to San Francisco in-
stead of going to Sacramento or to San Diego). !at 
you are going to San Francisco is a settled matter. !e 
point of the sentences (a.1) and (a.2) is to recommend 
a specic way of transport to San Francisco: drive a 
car, my friend, instead of boarding an airplane, or 
a train, or a boat etc.
!e use of the expression “driving” in (a.2) is im-
portant for my purposes. I wish to stress that the most 
important part of the message conveyed in the sen-
tence does not come with what seems to be the main 
verb, but with something that a supercial examina-
tion might regard as peripheral.
Now, I claim that the Greek passage for T1 is struc-
turally similar to sentences like (a.2): the most impor-
tant part of the message is conveyed in the participial 
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sentence, while the innitive is only setting the scene. I 
will parse its structure in this way:
“[i] πειρατέον δὲ περὶ πάντων τούτων ζητεῖν τὴν πίστιν 
διὰ τῶν λόγων [ii] μαρτυρίοις καὶ παραδείγμασι χρώμε-
νον τοῖς φαινομένοις” (1216b26-28).
!e core of the passage is the verbal adjective 
“πειρατέον”, “we must try”. But what exactly should we 
try? !e comma the editors put between “λόγων” and 
“μαρτυρίοις” is misleading in making the reader hover 
on step [i] as if it were the most important one or as 
it were delivering a complete message on its own. But 
this is not so. Step (i) does not convey the most impor-
tant part of the sentence, but is only setting the stage 
with what is presupposed by the most important part; 
step (ii) is the most important thing Aristotle says. 
!us, from the point of view of its structure, the most 
appropriate translation is Version 3 above: 
“(i) When we try to reach a conviction about all these 
questions through arguments, (ii) we must use what ap-
pears to be the case as evidence and example”4.
Why is this di"erence in structure so important? 
Because Aristotle’s message is – right from the start 
– presupposing both a distinction and a recommen-
dation that will be explored later. !e distinction is 
clearly made at 1216b35-39 (T2 below) and 1217a10-
17 (T6 below): on the one hand, there is the proposi-
tion targeted as conclusion of an argument: it is what 
one tries to establish or to explain by the argument; on 
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the other hand, there is the argument itself, which tries 
to establish or to explain the proposition that works as 
its conclusion. Aristotle is very explicit in saying that 
the appraisal of each of these must be separated. One 
thing is to accept the targeted proposition, which hap-
pens to be the conclusion. Another thing is to accept 
the explanation or proof o"ered by the argument. Be-
sides, there is also another recommendation: a warn-
ing against the use of inappropriate arguments (in 
1216b35-1217a10, T5 below).
I will examine later how my construal of T1 ts bet-
ter both the recommendation made at 1217a10-16 (T6 
below) and the warning made at 1216b35-1217a10 
(T5 below). For the time being, let me proceed with 
showing how my construal also delivers a more coher-
ent understanding of the initial paragraph of EE I.6. 
IV. Arguments, Facts and Explanations
I start with the distinction itself, which is a very fa-
miliar one from Aristotle’s theory of scientic knowl-
edge (APo II.1-2)5. On the one hand, there is the fact 
(or, in ethics, whatever it is that is fact-like, i.e., is tak-
en as explanandum). On the other hand, there is the 
explanation of the fact. Since explanations are struc-
tured as arguments, the fact to be explained or estab-
lished is also taken as the conclusion of the argument. 
!e distinction is presented in EE I.6 in this way:
T2: “In every discipline, there is a di"erence between 
philosophical and unphilosophical ways of argument. 
For this reason, even about political matters one should 
not regard as irrelevant the inquiry that makes clear not 
only the that but also the why6. For that way of proceeding 
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is the philosopher’s, in every discipline” (1216b35-39; the 
translation starts from Kenny’s and Wood’s, but modies 
many of their options).
It is not very clear what, exactly, Aristotle is talk-
ing about when he mentions arguments about politi-
cal matters. !ere are many options, but my propos-
al would not be a"ected by how this issue is settled 
(for I hope my proposal will prove useful for any of 
them). One option is that the fact-like target of the 
explanation is some basic practical proposition that 
a good agent accepts, whereas the explanation itself 
is the reasoning through which the agent justies her 
acceptance of or her acting on that proposition. (For 
instance: fact-like proposition: “one should be gen-
erous”; explanation: “because being generous is an 
achievement of our practical reasoning” or “because 
being generous paves the way to becoming richer and 
richer”). Another option is that the fact-like target 
of the explanation is some basic proposition in the 
systematic philosophical enterprise Aristotle is de-
veloping, whereas the explanation itself is the reason-
ing through which Aristotle, or another philosopher, 
might justify his acceptance of that proposition. (For 
instance: fact-like proposition: “eudaimonia is the 
best activity of reason”; explanation: “because eudai-
monia should be the primary good and must explain 
why every other good thing is good”). !ere is also 
the question about reputed opinions (as opposed to 
facts) as the supposed starting-point in ethical inves-
tigation. But I will not explore these interpretive is-
sues because my proposal does not depend on them. 
It is enough for my purposes to stress that both items 
involved in the distinction are objects of conviction 
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(pistis): any one has beliefs or convictions about facts 
(or practical propositions) as well as about explana-
tions (see APo 89a15-16)7. 
Now, the distinction is useful because there are 
three situations that Aristotle takes into consideration 
in the chapter. !e First situation is the highest desid-
eratum: one accepts the right fact (or fact-like practi-
cal proposition) and also explains it through an ap-
propriate explanation. !e Second situation is when 
one accepts the right fact (or fact-like practical propo-
sition), but does not explain it through the appropri-
ate explanation (see 1217a14-17): he gives an explana-
tion through an incorrect reason. !e !ird situation 
is when one uses an inappropriate argument to sup-
port a fact-like practical proposition which should 
not be accepted. Examples will be given in Section V. 
(A supposed fourth situation, in which one would use 
an appropriate argument to defend a fact-like practi-
cal proposition which should not be accepted, is im-
possible for Aristotle – as impossible as to conclude a 
falsity through a syllogism with true premises).
!ese situations have their analogues in the theo-
retical eld: rst, appropriate explanations deliver-
ing scientic knowledge correspond pretty much to 
the First situation; second, attempted explanations in 
which the explanandum is true, but the explanation is 
either false or is not the most appropriate one, corre-
spond to the Second situation; third, valid arguments 
leading to a falsity correspond to the !ird situation.
It is important to remark that the Second situation 
is such that the fact does not need to be established 
by the argument (even if one can use an argument to 
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establish it). It is already accepted as a fact, and the 
proposition expressing it is already taken to be true. 
What is unsatisfactory is the explanation of why the 
fact holds. Now, this situation contrasts with the !ird 
one, in which an argument makes someone jump 
from premises to a false conclusion. In the !ird situ-
ation, the conclusion the argument seems to establish 
is not one about which there was a previous convic-
tion, independently of the argument: the targeted 
conclusion deals with a matter on which acceptance 
is not yet settled. 
With these remarks in mind, let us come back to 
Version 1 of T1: 
T1: “(i) We must try, by argument, to reach a convincing 
conclusion on all these questions, (ii) using, as testimony 
and by way of example, what appears to be the case” 
(1216b26-28, Woods’s translation).
Now, as I have said, step (i) is a self-contained 
point in this Version. Even if step (ii) says that the 
use of arguments should be controlled by the appeal 
to phainomena as testimony and examples (whatev-
er this might mean), step (i) implies that there is no 
convincing conclusion (or merely no conviction) on 
these questions. !us, step (i) implies that arguments 
should be appealed to in order to settle the facts that 
deserve our conviction. And this suggests that what I 
have depicted as the !ird situation is lurking in the 
background. Since there is no settled facts concern-
ing all these questions, one must try to establish (or 
certify) facts through arguments in order to reach a 
conviction about them. But the appeal to arguments 
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is dangerous: as there can be valid arguments leading 
to false conclusions, so there can be bad arguments 
that lead one to accept practical propositions which 
should not be accepted. Because of this danger, the 
corrective highlighted in step (ii) is needed: yes, the 
fact-like propositions in the domain should be es-
tablished by argument, but under the control of the 
phainomena as testimonies and examples etc. 
On the other hand, Version 1 of T1 does not seem 
to accommodate the Second situation, in which the 
mistake in practical matters is subtler: one accepts 
the right fact (or fact-like practical proposition), but 
does not explain it through the appropriate explana-
tion (see 1217a14-17). I argue that this tells against 
Versions 1 and 2 of T1. What we nd in the text of 
EE I.6 is something di"erent than the !ird situation 
alone in the centre stage. !ere is an important men-
tion of the !ird situation (1217a13-14), but the Sec-
ond situation is also (if not much more) important. 
In the ensuing sections, I will argue in favour of Ver-
sion 3 of T1 from the following reasons: (a) Version 
3 can accommodate both the Second and the !ird 
situation; (b) the two remaining paragraphs of EE I.6 
seems to give much more importance to the Second 
situation, even if mentioning the !ird situation too.
V. A smooth argument for the first para-
graph of EE I.6:
!e rst paragraph of EE I.6 continues as follows:
T3: “[iii] !e best thing would be if everyone turned out 
to agree with what we are going to say; [iv] if not so, that 
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they should all agree in a way – which they might do with 
a change of direction; [v] for each man has something 
appropriate [oikeion ti] to contribute to the truth, from 
which it is necessary to explain in a way [deiknunai pôs] 
about these things. [vi] From things that are said with 
truth, but not in an enlightening way, there will be, as 
we proceed, what is also enlightening, with what is more 
perspicuous always superseding what is usually explai-
ned confusedly” (1216b28-35, my own translation, star-
ting with Kenny’s and Wood’s).
(I have numbered the steps starting with [iii] be-
cause T3 is continuous with T1). I will not discuss the 
details of the obscure step [iv] in T3. I will concentrate 
on three or four correlated points:
(1) in step [iii], “what we are going to say” refers 
to what Aristotle is going to develop in the ensuing 
chapters of EE, namely, explanatory accounts or ar-
guments that seek to explain, e.g., why eudaimonia 
cannot be the Good Itself, or why eudaimonia must 
involve the virtues of character. Aristotle is not pri-
marily concerned with agreement about “matters of 
fact”, but with agreement about appropriate explana-
tions. And this concern will explain the connection 
between T1 and T3 in a much better way.
(2) !e verb “deiknunai” in step [v] can be taken in 
the sense of explaining (cf. 1217a11, 15);
(3) !e expression “oikeion ti” (“something appro-
priate”) is referring to the premises or principles from 
which an argument explains something; even if “deik-
nunai” in step [v] is not taken in the sense of explaining, 
“oikeion ti” must refer to premises or principles from 
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which an argument tries to prove (or establish) some-
thing. !is entails that what Aristotle is designating as 
“appropriate for the truth” is not a bunch of basic fact-
like propositions – for these propositions are rather 
what needs to be explained, not that from which an ex-
planation is attempted. What each man has as appro-
priate for the truth are certain reasons or causes from 
which he gives some explanation for his explananda.
(4) Step [vi] might be taken as saying that ordinary 
explanatory accounts start with truths that are not 
enlightening because not suciently appropriate, but 
must end with truths that are enlightening because 
explanatorily appropriate. 
In what follows, I will $esh out these points. 
V.1. “What we are going to say”
!e expression “what we are going to say” in step 
[iii] in T3 refers to what Aristotle is going to advance 
in the ensuing chapters of EE: the pieces of ethical 
theory he is about to develop. Being so, an important 
question is how step [iii] is connected with the previ-
ous one, that is, how step [iii] can be understood as 
o"ering an explanation or justication for what Aris-
totle has advanced in T1. 
Some scholars take steps [iii]-[iv] as indicating that 
Aristotle “wish to win acceptance for the conclusions” 
(Woods, 1992, p.58), and the widest acceptance pos-
sible8. Now, this is still too vague: it means either that 
Aristotle wishes to win acceptance for the body of 
that-propositions found in his theory; or that Aristotle 
wishes to win acceptance for the body of explanations 
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that appropriately explain why the that-propositions 
within the theory should be accepted. On the rst 
option, it is implied that most people in the audience 
do not accept the EE body of that-propositions. Philo-
sophical understanding of the discussions in the EE 
would lead those people to accept that body of that-
propositions. However, if this is the case, then step [iii] 
would hardly be squared with step [ii] in T1, for in 
the latter Aristotle says that, when trying to produce 
conviction through arguments, we should take “what 
seems to be the case” as evidence and examples. Aris-
totle insists on this because he expects his own theory 
to correspond to “what seems to be the case” (Woods, 
1992, p.58): this translates “phainomena”, which stands 
for the explananda, i.e., that-propositions to be ex-
plained (I will explore later another option for under-
standing “phainomena”). !us, “people’s perceptions” 
(as Kenny translates it) involve acceptance of at least a 
considerable body of that-propositions. But, this being 
so, Aristotle can be taken as saying something prima 
facie inconsistent: in order to win conviction about 
that-propositions in ethical matters, one must take 
that-propositions as evidences etc. In order to produce 
conviction about justice in (say) John’s mind, one must 
take the correct that-propositions about justice which 
John already accepts. 
!ere are at least three ways to avoid this incon-
sistency9:
(1) One might suppose that there are di"erent groups 
of people accepting di"erent bodies of that-proposi-
tions: one group accepts “what appears to be the case” 
and thereby does not need corrective, while another 
group does not accept “what appears to be the case” and 
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thereby needs to be convinced through arguments. In 
order to convince people like James about the right that-
propositions concerning justice, one assumes the right 
that-propositions which John already accepts.
(2) One might argue that “marturiois” and “paradeig-
masi” has nothing to do with evidences or examples that 
conrm the correctness of a theory, but should rather 
be taken as the rhetorical jargon: they are the forms 
of arguments employed in rhetorical speeches, which 
aim at persuading the audience (Rhetoric 1375b26 ".; 
1356b2 ".; 1393a23-31)10. !is implies that “what ap-
pears to be the case” has some connection with what 
is likely (eikos), and for this reason it will furnish the 
premises for rhetorical arguments aiming to produce 
conviction in the skeptic or divergent group.
(3) One might argue that there is a di"erence be-
tween steps [i] and [ii] within T1: step [i] is talking 
about conviction concerning explanations, whereas 
step [ii] is talking about “what appears to be the case” 
as the factual data that explanations should explain. 
Proposal (1) has problems of its own11, but it shares 
with proposal (2) a common diculty. Both propos-
als must convince us that Aristotle had some hopes 
(or expectations) about the power of persuasion of 
his own theory. More than that: both proposals have 
to convince us that Aristotle’s project in the EE con-
templates arguments meant to change people’s mind 
about ethical matters12. 
I am skeptical about this claim. Aristotle is very 
clear in many passages that the relevant conviction in 
ethical matters – the conviction that leads one to act 
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upon his correct policies – depends on habituation 
(besides other factors). !e appeal to arguments alone 
would never be enough to instill the correct convic-
tion in one person13. Furthermore, the passage that 
comes immediately before T1 echoes the same idea: 
the main target of the philosophical enterprise devel-
oped in EE is not to produce knowledge about what 
things (such as justice and courage) are, but rather to 
show a route by which we can become just and coura-
geous (1216b16-25). 
!us, I prefer proposal (3) to avoid the potential in-
consistency. Besides, proposal (3) ts better with and 
provides further justication for Version 3 of T1: in 
step [i] of T1, Aristotle is just setting the scene in mak-
ing explicit what is presupposed by his main point. !e 
presupposition is that conviction concerning explana-
tions in practical matters comes through arguments. 
And this is obvious, given that, for Aristotle, expla-
nations take the form of arguments (in which the ex-
plananda are the targeted conclusion). What is most 
relevant is step [ii]: in employing arguments when 
seeking conviction concerning explanations about 
practical matters, one should take “what appears to be 
the case” (or people’s perceptions) as the explananda 
and, therefore, as the target that sets the pattern to 
judge the correctness of the attempted explanations14. 
!us, coming back to the connection between T1 
and its immediate continuation, steps [iii]-[iv] in T3, 
it is useful to ask: why on earth the best option is that 
“everyone should turn out to agree with what we are 
going to say”? And why this being the best option 
gives some support or justication for what was said 
in T1? I argue that Aristotle’s concern in step [iii] is 
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not to stress that everyone should turn out to accept 
the same that-propositions which are the correct ones. 
Neither is step [iv] saying that, if this universal agree-
ment is not the case, ethical discourse should take 
pains in trying to make people change their minds 
through arguments. (!e divergent ones probably 
deserve more punishment than argument, see Top-
ics 105a3-7 as well as EE 1214b31-33, 1215a2-3, or at 
least more habituation than argument). Aristotle has 
said in T1 that, when evaluating explanations through 
arguments on ethical matters, one should take “what 
appears to be the case” as setting the pattern to ap-
praise the correctness of attempted explanations. Now 
he adds in T3 the following reasoning: the best thing 
is that every man – within a restricted scope: every 
man concerned with explanations on ethical matters 
– turns out to agree with the explanations which will 
appear in the ensuing discussions. !us, he is only fo-
cusing on philosophers attempting to explain the rel-
evant data in the domain. I will argue that steps [v] 
and [vi] can be much better understood in their con-
text with this proposal. (I will skip the vexing step [iv], 
because any discussion of it will lead me too far away).
V. 2: “Deiknunai” as “to explain”
!e most accepted translation for “deiknunai” is 
“to prove”. It is beyond the limits of this paper to of-
fer a full discussion of this issue. It is enough for my 
purposes to advance the fair proposal that “to explain” 
is also a reasonable translation in many passages of 
Aristotle’s works. “To prove” is more suited to con-
texts where the target of the proof is something un-
settled or unwarranted: a proposition the truth-value 
of which is unknown, or a claim that has not been 
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certied by careful observation etc. However, in some 
contexts the conclusion targeted by the argument is 
not something unsettled or uncertied. !e targeted 
conclusion is a proposition the truth of which is al-
ready taken for granted. !e aim of the argument is to 
capture the cause that explains why it is true. In such 
contexts, “to explain” is a preferable translation. I be-
lieve that “to explain” is a better translation for most 
occurrences within the Posterior Analytics. And I ar-
gue that “to explain” is also a better translation in T3, 
for in the ethical domain the fact-like propositions 
must have been accepted through reasoned habitua-
tion rather than be established by argument alone15.
Furthermore, I submit that the adverb “pos” in 
1216b32 must be taken with “deiknunai”, not with 
“anankaion” (or any other option). Aristotle is talking 
about arguments that deliver some explanation, but 
not the most appropriate one. An advantage of my in-
terpretation is that I can account for this adverb, which 
has “disappeared” both in Wood’s and in Kenny’s trans-
lations (but not in Inwood-Wolf ’s translation).
V.3. “Something appropriate towards the 
truth”
!e expression “oikeion ti” is what is taken back by 
the expression “ex hon” (“from which”)16. I don’t be-
lieve it merely means “something of his own” (Wood’s 
and Kenny’s translations) or “some anity with the 
truth” (Inwood-Woolf ’s translation) in the sense of 
some “natural aptitude for grasping truth” (Barnes, 
1980, p.508). It is rather related to the appropriate ex-
planations (“oikeious logous”) mentioned in 1217a9. 
It is fair to say that the pronoun “auton” in 1216b32 
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refers to the domain of that-propositions about prac-
tical matters – which are the explananda. Now, if you 
are going to explain why P, you cannot take the same 
proposition P as your premise. !us, if you are going 
to explain a that-proposition about practical matters, 
your explanatory premises must be di"erent from 
the that-proposition you are trying to explain. !en, 
the expression “ex hon”, which takes back “oikeion ti” 
(“something appropriate”), cannot refer to that-prop-
ositions that everyone (or almost everyone) accepts. 
A better option is to take the expressions “ex hon” 
and “oikeion ti” as referring to the premises from 
which an argument explains its explanandum17.
I should also note that “aletheian” in 1216b31 must 
not be taken as alluding to the truth-value of the that-
propositions in the domain. Aristotle has some dif-
culties with expressions properly applicable to rela-
tions between propositions – including explanatory 
relations between propositions. Sometimes he uses 
the word “oikeion” as applied (or properly applicable) 
to the explanation itself, which involves a relation be-
tween the proposition to be explained and the prop-
ositions encapsulating the explanatory factors. But 
sometimes words such as “alethes” and “pseudos” are 
applied to explanations: the “true explanation” is the 
right or correct explanation, the one which, besides 
involving true propositions, captures the most appro-
priate explanatory factor, while “false explanations” 
are those that miss the most appropriate explanatory 
factor (even if they consist in a set of premises that 
are themselves true as bare propositions)18. 
!us, what each human being has as appropri-
ate towards the truth is some grasp of premises from 
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which acceptable explanations can be worked out. 
A rst explanation from these premises might not be 
the most appropriate one, but is on the right track19.
V.4. “Truths that are not enlightening”
Step [vi] is one of the most famous of the EE, if 
not of Aristotle’s works. !e interpretation of the text, 
though, is far from being easy. At least a great progress 
was made with Kenny’s translation, which uses the 
notion of being enlightening – instead of the notion of 
being clear – to translate “saphôs” (1216b33)20. !ere 
is no reasonable sense in saying that someone grasps 
the truth of a given proposition which he does not un-
derstand clearly. !e clarity about what a proposition 
means is required if one really grasps its truth (apart 
from metaphorical usages of the expression “grasping 
the truth”). !us, the non-sense is avoided with Ken-
ny’s translation. But there are still too many options, 
and to decide which one is to be preferred is a very 
challenging procedure. 
A rst option is the following: 
(a) what is said with truth but is not enlightening 
is the explanandum itself (because its formulation 
lacks the explanatory factor), whereas what is en-
lightening (and more intelligible, or more perspicu-
ous) is the explanans. !is is promising, but then we 
should explicate how the same explanandum, which 
is taken to be true but not enlightening, seems to be 
described as something “said confusedly” (1216b34-
35). !e risk of non-sense is back: one grasps the 
truth of the explanandum, but one does not clearly 
understand its meaning because it is confused.
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A second option is the following:
(b) what is said with truth but is not enlightening 
is a certain description of the explanandum, whereas 
what is enlightening (and more intelligible) is either 
a more accurate description of the explanandum or 
the explanans itself. !e original description of the 
explanandum is said to be non-enlightening because 
its lack of accuracy (in attempting to isolate the most 
characteristic feature of the explanandum) does not 
promote or does not facilitate the search for the ex-
planatory factor. In this case, it makes sense to report 
the original description of the explanandum as some-
thing “usually said confusedly”. !e next step towards 
full enlightenment need not be the explanans itself: 
a more accurate description of the explanandum 
would be enough to put the search for causes on the 
right track.
!ere is still a third option:
(c) what is said with truth but is not enlightening 
is a certain explanation, which is not yet the most ap-
propriate one, whereas what is enlightening (and more 
intelligible) is either the most appropriate explanans 
or an explanans that is at least more appropriate than 
the original one. !e original explanation is said to be 
non-enlightening because it is not the most appropriate 
one – because it lacks the most appropriate explanatory 
factor and, consequently, is less enlightening than the 
ultimate explanation. In this case, it makes sense to re-
port the original explanation as something “confusedly 
explained”, at least if “confusedly” can be understood as 
pointing to an explanatory factor that delivers an un-
satisfactory (and incomplete) explanation not only of 
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the targeted explanandum but also of other explananda 
of a similar sort. (More on this below).
It is hard to decide which interpretation should be 
preferred about step [vi] of T3. I will argue below that 
the next paragraph of EE I.6 suggests the third op-
tion as the central one. However, my aim in this paper 
is a modest one. A reasonable decision on this issue 
should take into consideration how the methodologi-
cal chapter EE I.6 as a whole ts with what has been 
said previously and with what is going to follow in the 
EE. !ere is no room in this paper for pursuing this 
careful examination. I will argue that the evidence in-
side EE I.6 seems to favour the third option. But I will 
point out that other passages are compatible with the 
second option as well. 
Take what Aristotle says before starting the exam-
ination of what virtue of character is. !e text runs 
as follows:
T4: “As in other matters, all researchers start with some-
thing already at hand, so in conducting our search we 
must make use of statements that are true but not enli-
ghtening to try to achieve an outcome that is both true 
and enlightening. At present we are in the same position 
as if we knew that health was the best condition of the 
body, and that Coriscus was the swarthiest man in the 
marketplace, without knowing what or who they are. 
Such a position may be helpful as a step towards the kno-
wledge of each of the two” (1220a15-22, Kenny’s transla-
tion modied).
Now, the proposition that health is the best condi-
tion of the body can be taken either as a starting-point 
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for the inquiry into what health is or as a candidate 
premise to explain (for instance) why health should 
be given priority in most circumstances. If the propo-
sition is taken as a starting-point for the inquiry into 
what health is, then health itself is (so to speak) the 
explanandum – at least in so far as a deniendum can 
be taken as equivalent to an explanandum, which is 
something suggested by Aristotle’s contention that to 
know what it is amounts to knowing why it is (see APo 
90a14-15, 31-32, 93a4)21. !us, the target will be the 
most important explanatory factor to be encapsulated 
inside the ultimate denition of health. To use one of 
Aristotle’s favoured examples in APo II, the target will 
be something like the extinction of re as the explana-
tory factor that completes the denitional account of 
thunder (93b8-12, 94a3-5). And the proposition that 
health is the best condition of the body can be taken 
as a true but not enlightening description of the ex-
planandum – not enlightening because it does not 
capture the most important explanatory factor, and 
perhaps also because it does not determine a clear 
path to the search for the complete denition22.
!is interpretation is also favoured by the other ex-
ample employed in T4, namely, the proposition that 
Coriscus is the swarthiest person in the market. !e 
only di"erence is that there is no denition of Coris-
cus, but Aristotle seems to suggest that being fully ac-
quainted with Coriscus will be the analogue of grasp-
ing the essence of health. 
However, there is no a priori assurance that both 
examples, the one about health and the one about 
Coriscus, should be taken as exactly equivalent. 
Aristotle might have used Coriscus to point to this 
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situation, whereas using health to allude to a di"erent 
situation. Suppose one wishes to explain why health 
should be pursued by most people in most circum-
stances over and above other practical aims. Now, it 
might help to say that health is the best condition of 
the body: one can easily understand that, this being so, 
it is highly desirable to be healthy etc. However, sup-
pose a circumstance in which a general must decide 
whether to take a given strategy which will be very im-
portant to settle the war but will put in risk the health 
of his soldiers (such as passing through a eld full of 
contaminated ticks, from which the soldiers might 
contract spotted fever). Appealing to the proposition 
that health is the best condition of the body would 
never explain why the strategy should or should not be 
adopted at the end of the day. My example involves de-
liberative reasoning, but I submit that the same story 
would work for an attempted explanation of the prac-
tical value of health over other goods. !e proposition 
that health is the best condition of the body would be 
taken as a candidate premise to explain why health 
should be given priority in some circumstances23. As 
an isolated proposition, it is true; but, as an explana-
tory premise, it does not seem enlightening, even if it 
might help to nd the best explanation.
VI. Inappropriate explanations
It remains – while arguing in favour of option (c) – 
to discuss how my construal of T1 ts better both the 
recommendation made at 1217a10-17 and the warn-
ing made at 1216b35-1217a10. 
First, the warning – which might be taken to be 
against “false philosophers”:
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T5: “Now, great caution is needed here. Since it seems 
that a philosopher should never speak at a venture, but 
always with reason, some people o"er reasons [= expla-
nations, logous] that are inappropriate or empty, and of-
ten get away with it. (Some people do this in error; others 
are sheer charlatans.) By such arguments even people of 
experience and practical ability can be caught out by pe-
ople who lack even the capability for practical or strate-
gic thinking. !is comes about through want of culture: 
for want of culture is the inability to distinguish between 
explanations [arguments, logoi] that are appropriate, and 
those that are inappropriate, to a given explanandum” 
(1216b40-1217a10, Kenny’s translation modied). 
Philosophical enterprises on practical matters also 
aim at explanations: this is what denes them as phil-
osophical24. But caution is needed here. Many take 
advantage of the fact that explanations are always ex-
pected and always aimed at: they introduce explana-
tions that are irrelevant for the issue at stake or, what 
is even more dangerous, explanations that, even being 
inappropriate for the explanandum at stake, sound 
appealing to people without philosophical training 
– without a training in searching for and discussing 
explanations25. 
Now, one might argue that “allotrioi logoi” (in 
1217a2 and 9-10) are not inappropriate explanations, 
but only arguments that are “extraneous to the subject” 
(Inwood-Woolf) or “foreign to the inquiry” (Woods) 
or foreign to the subject-matter (Irwin, 1988, p.28), 
while their counterpart, the “oikeioi logoi”, would be 
the arguments appropriate to the subject. A lot depends 
on what “subject” means here. Most take “subject” to 
mean subject-matter (Kenny, 2011, p.9) or the broad 
notion of a domain of inquiry. !us, arguments foreign 
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to the subject-matter would pass undetected by men 
experienced in the practical domain. Well, it might 
be plausible to say that arguments with premises from 
medicine or geometry would deceive the practical ex-
perienced man when applied to practical matters. But I 
nd it hard to believe that someone really experienced 
and capable of action would not do what his experience 
tell him to do because a charlatan or an ignorant per-
son imposes on him a di"erent conclusion from geo-
metrical premises. If they are duped by such charlatans, 
they do not deserve to be called “experienced and usu-
ally competent in the domain of actions”. !us, a much 
better interpretation results if “subject” is taken not as 
subject-matter, but as the exact explanandum that is at 
stake in each argument. As I have argued in other occa-
sions, “explanandum” is a good translation of what Ar-
istotle means in some occurrences of “pragma” – and 
1217a9 is one of those occurrences (and “pragmateia” 
in 1217a3 can be translated as “explanatory enterprise” 
or something like that). 
Suppose someone asks why eudaimonia must in-
clude virtue of character (1216a38-b2): this question 
is his pragma. Suppose the bad philosopher (or the 
charlatan) answers that eudaimonia must include vir-
tue of character because eudaimonia is the Good It-
self. !is might be true, but is not enlightening (as it 
is not enlightening to receive the answer “vegetables!” 
when, transported by the smell in a restaurant, you 
ask your next table friend “what are you eating?”). 
!is might pass undetected as bad philosophy even 
by human beings who are experienced and fully com-
petent in practical matters. Again, suppose someone 
asks why eudaimonia must include temperance and 
the bad philosopher (or the charlatan) answers with 
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an argument saying that it is because eudaimonia, be-
ing the best of the goods, must include being wealthy, 
whereas being intemperate might lead one to lose 
his wealth. !is might also pass unnoticed as bad 
philosophy by those who are experienced and fully 
competent in practical matters. Now, bad philosophy 
(or charlatanry) might even lead people to accept the 
wrong that-propositions in the practical eld. Sup-
pose another bad philosopher starts saying that eu-
daimonia is ataraxy, then argues that one should be 
undisturbed by mundane needs, ending with the ulti-
mate conclusion that one should not be generous (as 
being generous implies disturbance with other peo-
ple’s needs or poverty and, thus, spoils ataraxy). !is 
last example illustrates the !ird situation (from sec-
tion IV), in which arguments lead people astray from 
the right that-propositions. But the other examples il-
lustrate the Second situation, in which the attempted 
explanations for that-propositions rely on inappropri-
ate premises. !e worry about experienced practical 
people being led astray by bad philosophers seems to 
lurk in Aristotle’s mind too, but I submit that he is 
mainly worried with inappropriate explanations on 
the level of a philosophical enterprise such as the one 
he is undertaking in the EE. He is concerned with the 
appropriateness of the explanations in his philosophi-
cal enterprise. When he says that people experienced 
and capable of action can be “caught out” by bad 
philosophers or charlatans, he is not suggesting that 
those people can be misled into abandoning the right 
policies that experience and practical competence has 
consolidated in their lives. He is just saying that those 
people will be unable to detect the bad philosopher 
and the charlatan as such. When the latter present their 
inappropriate arguments, the experienced people will 
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be unable to tell that this is bad philosophy or charla-
tanry. !is is suggested by the last part of T5, namely 
1217a7-10: the experienced people lack the proper 
training in philosophical discussions and, because of 
this, they will be unable to judge which explanations 
are appropriate and which are inappropriate ones. But 
nothing in this passage suggests that bad philosophy 
or charlatanry will win their acceptance to the point 
of making them change their lives. 
!us, T5 strongly suggests that step [vi] of T3 should 
be preferentially taken according to the third option 
(c). A given explanation is said to be non-enlightening 
because it is not the most appropriate one for the ex-
planandum at stake: it lacks the most appropriate ex-
planatory factor and, consequently, is less enlightening 
than the ultimate explanation. !e inappropriate ex-
planation can also be said to be “confusedly explained” 
in the sense that it points to an explanatory factor that 
could also have been poured into some story account-
ing for di"erent explananda. Again, suppose someone 
asks why eudaimonia must include virtue of charac-
ter (1216a38-b2) and a philosopher answers that it is 
because eudaimonia is the best of the human goods. 
Now, it is true that eudaimonia must include virtue of 
character, as well as it is true that eudaimonia is the 
best of the human goods. However, the same prem-
ise that eudaimonia is the best of the human goods 
might deliver a similar (and equally vague) answer to 
the question why eudaimonia must include practical 
wisdom (or why it must include pleasures). None of 
these explanations will be the appropriate one. And 
part of their inappropriateness is that they are too gen-
eral and miss the exact nature of the explanandum at 
stake. However, these explanatory stories, which are 
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“confusedly explained”, involve true propositions and 
give at least some basis for someone to seek the right 
track to the appropriate explanations. 
VI. Conclusion
I will nish with the recommendation made at 
1217a10-16.
T6: “It is well to make a separate judgement about 
the explanandum [deiknumenon = what one is try-
ing to explain] and the explanation of the cause, be-
cause of what was said before, namely, that there are 
o#en cases where one should attend not to the results 
of arguments, but rather to the people’s perceptions; 
(as things are, if people cannot refute an argument, 
they are constrained to believe in what has been said); 
and also because it o#en happens that what is taken to 
have been explained by argument is in fact true, but 
not for the reason o"ered by the argument.” (1217a10-
16, Kenny’s translation modied).
I take “deiknumenon” in 1217a11 as standing for 
what one is trying to explain, i.e., the explanandum, 
which takes the place of the conclusion in explana-
tory arguments (parallel occurrences can be found in 
APo 74a5 and 75b38). On the same track, I take “ai-
tias logos” as introducing the account of the cause or, 
more precisely, the argument that presents the cause 
or explanatory factor for a given explanandum.
Aristotle gives two reasons for separating the apprais-
al of the explanandum from the appraisal of the explana-
tion. First, relying merely on arguments without paying 
attention to what appears to be the case might lead one 
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to accept a false conclusion. !is seems to refer to what 
I have labelled the !ird situation: one uses an inappro-
priate argument to support a fact-like practical propo-
sition which nobody should accept. Second, sometimes 
the proposition which seems to have been explained 
through an explanatory argument is itself a true propo-
sition, but the argument does not captures the correct 
explanatory factor. !is seems to refer to what I have la-
belled the Second situation: one accepts the correct fact 
(or fact-like practical proposition), but does not explain 
it through the appropriate explanation.
Now, since the Second situation is present through-
out the chapter, I suggest that it is more promising to 
take step [vi] of T3 as referring to it as well: explana-
tions might come in premises that are true proposi-
tions themselves without being enlightening enough, 
because the explanatory factor presented in them is 
not the most appropriate one. !is sort of explana-
tion is the main target of Aristotle’s warning in T5 
(1216b40-1217a10). 
Now, in T1, it might seem that the !ird situation is 
the central one. In using arguments to seek conviction 
about explanations, one should employ people’s percep-
tions as evidence, i.e., as the basic data that require expla-
nation and set the reference to judge the successfulness 
of attempted explanations, for, without this reference, 
arguments might lead to false conclusions. In a way, I 
will be comfortable with such a result within the limits 
of this paper. However, the Second situation turns out to 
appear in T1 too if “phainomena” can be taken as refer-
ring to explanatory accounts. Indeed, there is no reason 
precluding the expression “what appears to be the case” 
from covering explanations as well: e.g., “it seems to be 
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the case that crops have increased because it rained more 
than expected”. !e phainomenon in this sentence is an 
explanatory claim. More importantly, Aristotle does use 
“phainomenon” in this sense in at least two passages in 
the Corpus: de Caelo 288a2 (perhaps 291b25), and Parts 
of Animals 645a5 (which refers back to the de Caelo pas-
sage). !e point of T1 would be the following: in using 
arguments to seek conviction about explanations, one 
should employ what seems to be case as witnesses and 
examples in order to avoid the emptiness of inappropri-
ate explanations: in this context, “what seems to the case” 
would refer to the explanation that most competently 
delivers its explanatory service, i.e., most appropriately 
sticks with the exact explanandum at stake.
Even if my reader is not inclined to accept this sug-
gestion as the conclusion of my discussion, I stress the 
chief claim I started with, namely: Aristotle’s point in T1 
is not that conviction about the issues at stake should be 
attained by arguments, as if the that-propositions on the 
eld were still unsettled (or uncertied) and were go-
ing to be settled (or certied) by appealing to arguments 
(instead of being instilled by habituation). Nor is Aris-
totle expecting that the employment of arguments will 
be the most powerful method to make people change 
their minds on ethical matters. Aristotle is most con-
cerned with the warning against the charlatans and the 
bad philosophers, who venture to attempt explanations 
that do not appropriately explain their explananda26.
Notes
1  See Devereux (2015); Karbowski (2015b); Zillig (2014); 
Cooper (2009). !e discussion invariably reacts to the inter-
pretive trend started with Owen (1961) and strengthened by 
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Barnes (1980) and Irwin (1988): Aristotle’s ethics relies on a di-
"erent method which starts from opinions etc. I will not discuss 
directly either the trend or the reaction to it, but of course my 
claims will have consequences on that debate.
2  My interpretation is close to Karbowski (2015b, p.205-6), 
who approaches EE and APo II in terms of the methodology 
for the discovery of principles. However, my proposal has many 
di"erences with Karbowski’s: unfortunately, there is no room is 
this paper to develop them.
3  !e same is true about Inwood-Woolf ’s translation. What 
concerns me here is something that these three translations 
have in common about the structure of the text, even being di-
"erent in their terminological choices.
4  Similarly, (a.2) “you must go to San Francisco driving” can 
be taken as equivalent to (and as ‘translatable’ into) “since you 
are going to San Francisco, drive a car to get there”. If sentence 
(a.2) were taken according to Version 2 for the EE passage, it 
would be equivalent to the following: “it is to San Francisco that 
you must go; besides, drive a car to get there” or “it is absolutely 
necessary for you to go to San Francisco; besides, drive a car to 
get there”. 
5  See Karbowski (2015b, p.203-5); and Natali (2010), who 
explores this distinction for the Nicomachean Ethics. For a full 
exploration of the distinction itself, see Charles (2000, p.69-71) 
and Bronstein (2016, p.74-83).
6  !ere is no need of accepting the emendation of ‘to ti’ to 
‘to hoti’ with Kenny (2011, p.151). See Karbowski (2015b, p.204, 
n.30). !e expression ‘to ti’ is clearly working in the way Aris-
totle has ascribed for ‘to hoti’ in APo 89b24 ". !e shi# from 
one expression to another seems natural (see 90a3-4) and the 
meaning in EE I.6 is guaranteed by the contrast with ‘to dia ti’. 
Passages like 90a3-4 shows that Aristotle is not regimenting his 
own terminology. 
7  On 89a15-16, see Fine (2010, p.148), and Angioni (2013, 
p.257-8).
8  See Barnes (1980, p.507); Cooper (1999, p.289, n. 13); De-
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consensus omnium”); Frede (2012, p.211); Karbowski (2015b, 
p.201-2).
9  Woods (1992, p.58) does not seem to detect the incon-
sistency because he has a di"erent grasp of how the distinction 
hoti/ dioti works here: he says that the conclusions should be 
“systematic developments of ordinary intuitions”. When he $e-
shes out this idea, he attributes to the “ordinary opinions” not 
only “inaccuracies” and “defects of formulation”, but also “lack 
of certainty”. But this is a loose way to relate the phainomena to 
the hoti: the latter usually refers to the  basic and assured facts 
in the domain. Another option is found in Irwin (1988, p.46-7, 
347): arguments should prove that this is so concerning what 
people merely believe to be so. Again, I don’t think this squares 
with the appeal to the hoti/ dioti distinction.
10  For the discussion of “examples” as arguments of a speci-
c sort, see Karbowski (2015b, p.208-210).
11 E.g., it depends on a peculiar interpretation of the 
verb “metabibazomenoi” in 1216b30. See Mendonça (2015, 
p. 109-110).
12  See Devereux (2015, p.140-147), on the methodologi-
cal di"erences between EE and EN. If I have understood him 
correctly, he believes that the EE discussion has those high 
expectations.
13  On this, I follow Karbowski (2015, p.124-5). See Nico-
machean Ethics 1098b3-4; 1095b4-6; 1105a28-b9. A potential 
problem would be that, as Devereux (2015, p.146) points out, 
the EE is not so fond of the claim that character determines eva-
luative beliefs. But this would not go too far as implying that the 
EE rejects the claim that habituation is required for our access 
to the that-propositions.
14  See Generation of Animals 760b30-33: one should trust 
arguments only if they explain things that agree with the phai-
nomena, but one should never trust arguments over and above 
the facts.
15  For a di"erent view, see Devereux (2015, p.135). A po-
tential problem would be “deixai” in 1217a17: if it were taken 
in the sense of “explaining”, it would clash with Prior Analytics 
53b8-10, where Aristotle says that it is impossible to explain 
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the why from false premises. But I can cope with this poten-
tial objection. Aristotle sometimes applies “false” and “true” not 
to elemental propositions but to explanations (besides other 
complex sentences). Consider the syllogism: “Every human 
is mammal; every mammal is mortal; therefore, every human 
is mortal”. Both premises are true propositions in themselves. 
Even so, they do not deliver the most appropriate explanation of 
the conclusion. We might say that the syllogism conveys a “false 
explanation”. I argue that some uses of “pseudes” in Aristotle can 
be understood in this way – including 1217a17. !e reference 
in 1217a17 to the Analytics might be to the passage 74b27-32.
16  It does not matter that “hon” is plural and “oikeion ti” is 
singular. I agree with Karbowski (2015b, p.202, n.25). Barnes 
(1980, p.506), thinks that the antecedent of “hon” must be the 
phainomena in 1216b28, but he gives no argument for that.
17  My contention depends on my previous point about 
“deiknunai pos”. One might object that, if “deiknunai pos” is 
not taken in the way I propose, the expression “from which” 
can then be taken as pointing either to that-propositions which 
will be puried from inconsistencies etc., or to ordinary cre-
dentials that might support premises from which to explain the 
that-propositions (see note 19 on Karbowski 2015b). However, 
the concern with explanations in the chapter strongly suggests 
that the expression “from which” must be taken as pointing to 
premises that attempt an explanation, for this is how Aristotle 
usually employs the expression in his theory of scientic expla-
nations in the APo. 
18  I have explored the issue in Angioni (2014, p.75-83). 
Woods (1992, p.59), seems to $irt with my contention when he 
says that “the possibility alluded to here is […] that even a valid 
argument with true premises may not give the correct reason”. 
19  A more ne-grained proposal is found in Karbowski 
(2015b, p. 210-213): the expression ‘something appropriate […] 
from which’ refers not directly to the premises of explanations, 
but to phainomena (covering “universal agreement, empirical 
observation and ordinary life experience”) that give support to 
formulating the premises for the explanations. On the whole, 
my proposal is very congenial to his, even if diverging in details 
about the interpretation of the passage.
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20  See Lesher (2010) for the uses of “saphôs” and cognates 
indicating accuracy or even the highest form of knowledge.
21  See Charles (2000, p.213-220), for the interdependence 
between explaining and dening in APo.
22  Zillig (2012, p.308-315), develops such an approach 
about the renement in the denition of what eudaimonia is in 
EE I.7-8. See also Karbowski (2015b, p.206-7) and Mendonça 
(2017).
23  Zillig (2014, p.228), seems to go in a similar direction: the 
proposition that eudaimonia is the best of the human goods is 
true but not enlightening because its role as a principle in further 
specications of what is good for us might be ine"ective. Zillig 
suggests that the proposition is not enlightening because, being 
too vague and when accompanied by inadequate additional in-
formation, it allows (in a level of further specication) an incor-
rect application of the term to something that is not eudaimonia. 
24  Aristotle sometimes uses the word “philosophos” and 
cognates to point to those who really love knowledge itself and 
thereby pursue the causes. See Parts of Animals 645a10 (also de 
Caelo 291b27).
25  For a di"erent interpretation, see Woods (1992, p.59): 
Aristotle is relying on the idea that good philosophers must 
comprehend that explanations are not needed for the principles.
26  I am grateful to Raphael Zillig and Fernando Mendonça 
for comments on a previous dra# of this paper. I also thanks 
Raphael Zillig, Inara Zanuzzi, Rodrigo Guerizoli, Felipe Wein-
mann and Breno Zuppolini for many discussions on Ethica Eu-
demia I.6 and correlated issues. Discussions with Raphael Zillig 
and Fernando Mendonça about “the method of endoxa” have 
undoubtedly framed my mind on the issues developed in this 
paper, including when both have presented papers dealing with 
the same passage in Campinas and Porto Alegre.
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